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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,   ) 
     ) NO. 43908 
 Plaintiff-Respondent, )  
     ) ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2015-5021 
v.     ) 
     ) 
ZACHARY EUGENE THARP, ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
     ) 
 Defendant-Appellant. ) 
___________________________) 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Zachary Tharp appeals, contending the district court abused its discretion by 
imposing an excessive sentence following his guilty plea to discharging a firearm at a 
dwelling.  Specifically, he contends that, by imposing as long a fixed sentence as it did, 
the district court foreclosed the opportunity for timely rehabilitation to occur despite the 
presentence investigator’s recognition that Mr. Tharp “is young enough to make the 
necessary changes should his professed intentions [to rehabilitate] be genuine.” 
(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.23.)  A sufficient consideration of 
the mitigating factors, such as his imperfect self-defense claim, shows the more lenient 
sentence would better serve the goals of sentencing in this case.  As such, this Court 
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should either reduce Mr. Tharp’s sentence as it deems appropriate, or, alternatively, 
remand this case for a new sentencing decision.  
 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
 Mr. Tharp was only 26 years old at the time of the instant offense.  (Tr., Vol.1, 
p.4, L.25 - p.5, L.1.)1  He had a dysfunctional childhood, as both parents were drug 
addicts.  (PSI, p.503.)  Mr. Tharp also had some psychiatric hospitalizations during his 
childhood.  (PSI, p.16.)  Notably, following his father’s death, Mr. Tharp was diagnosed 
with major depressive disorder, a mood disorder, complicated bereavement, and 
polysubstance abuse.  (PSI, p.591; see also PSI, p.104 (more recent evaluations giving 
rule out diagnoses for a mood disorder not otherwise specified, generalized anxiety 
disorder, and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder).)  A few years later, he suffered 
a closed head injury in an automobile accident.  (PSI, pp.16, 585.)  Evaluations 
conducted during the PSI process in this case recommended he participate in intensive 
outpatient treatment to deal with the mental health issues he continues to experience.  
(PSI, pp.101, 113.)   
Mr. Tharp had also been struggling to find housing after serving a prior sentence.  
(PSI, p.22)  Those struggles meant that he was unable to maintain the employment he 
had found, which was a graveyard shift.  (Tr., Vol.2, p.18, L.17 - p.19, L.1.)  From there, 
things began spiraling out of his control.  (Tr., Vol.2, p.19, Ls.1-3.)  He met a girlfriend 
                                            
1 The transcripts in this case are provided in two independently bound and paginated 
volumes.  To avoid confusion, “Vol.1” will refer to the volume containing the transcript of 
the change of plea hearing held on October 5, 2015.  “Vol.2” will refer to the volume 
containing the transcript of the sentencing hearing held on December 21, 2015. 
3 
who may not have been the best influence on him.  (See Tr., Vol.2, p.19, Ls.4-5.)  Still, 
he had the desire to work on overcoming their drug addictions.  (See PSI, pp.5, 7.) 
 However, that process was not easy, and his girlfriend made statements 
indicating her suicidal ideations to overdose on heroin and oxycodone.  (PSI, p.7.)  
When Mr. Tharp learned who was continuing to supply her with drugs, he and the 
dealer exchanged texts, which became an argument, which escalated to a challenge to 
fight.  (PSI, pp.5, 7.)  The district court accepted Mr. Tharp’s explanation that he was 
intending only to confront the dealer, and that he had not intended to fire his gun during 
that confrontation.  (Tr., Vol.2, p.22, Ls.13-19.)   
On the way to the confrontation, Mr. Tharp said his girlfriend warned him that the 
dealer had guns and grenades, and he would try to kill Mr. Tharp.  (PSI, p.7.)  Upon 
arriving at the designated place, Mr. Tharp saw the person he believed to be his 
girlfriend’s dealer, and thought he saw that person draw a weapon.  (PSI, p.7.)  Defense 
counsel pointed out that there were witness statements which corroborated Mr. Tharp’s 
account that people were shooting toward him.  (Tr., p.16, Ls.3-4; see PSI, pp.198-99 
(police report of those statements).)  Regardless, Mr. Tharp admitted that he reacted 
inappropriately to that situation, as he proceeded to fire his own weapon in the direction 
of the dealer, hitting several nearby residences in the process, before fleeing the scene.  
(PSI, pp.7-8.)  Several charges were brought against Mr. Tharp as a result of his 
actions.  (R., pp.37-39.) 
 Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Tharp pled guilty to one count of discharging a 
firearm at an occupied dwelling.  (Tr., Vol.1, p.1, Ls.11-12.)  Although the remaining 
charges would be dismissed pursuant to that agreement, Mr. Tharp agreed to pay 
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restitution on the dismissed counts.2  (Tr., Vol.1, p.1, Ls.14-16.)  The State also agreed 
to limit its sentencing recommendation to a unified term of fifteen years, with seven 
years fixed.  (Tr., Vol.1, p.1, Ls.12-14.) 
 At the ensuing sentencing hearing, defense counsel explained Mr. Tharp realized 
a period of probation or retained jurisdiction would not be proper in his case.  (Tr., Vol.2, 
p.17, Ls.6-7, 17-20.)  As a result, defense counsel recommended a unified sentence of 
fifteen years, but with only three years fixed.  (Tr., Vol.2, p.20, Ls.4-7.)  The difference 
between her recommendation and the prosecutor’s, defense counsel argued, was that 
her recommendation created motivation and an opportunity for Mr. Tharp to engage in 
timely rehabilitative programming during his incarceration.  (Tr., Vol.2, p.20, Ls.4-9.)  If 
Mr. Tharp committed to his programming, defense counsel explained, he would be 
eligible for parole, but if he did not, he could still be required to serve the maximum term 
authorized by statute.  (Tr., Vol.2, p.20, Ls.4-8.)   
For his part, Mr. Tharp expressed his remorse and accepted responsibility for his 
actions.  (Tr., Vol.2, p.21, Ls.1-13; see also PSI, pp.7-8, 19.)  He also expressed his 
amenability to rehabilitation.  (See, e.g., PSI, p.23.)  To that point, he explained that he 
had decided to denounce his prior gang lifestyle.  (PSI, pp.12-13.)  The PSI author 
summarized his situation: 
Mr. Tharp professed a strong desire to change his lifestyle, abstain from 
drugs, and obtain employment skills and experience in order to sustain his 
desired change.  The defendant’s criminal record and past documented 
behavior of chronic drug use and gang affiliation indicate Mr. Tharp has 
substantial challenges to overcome; fortunately for him the defendant is 
young enough to make the necessary changes should his professed 
intentions be genuine. 
                                            
2 The prosecutor subsequently indicated she would not be filing a restitution request in 
this case.  (Tr., Vol.2, p.6, Ls.16-18.) 
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(PSI, p.23.)  
However, the district court explained it did not have confidence that Mr. Tharp 
would take advantage of programming opportunities.  (Tr., Vol.2, p.25, Ls.1-3.)  It noted 
that he had issues while serving his prior sentence, and he had been afforded 
programming before which had not been effective.  (Tr., Vol.2, p.23, L.10 - p.24, L.19.)  
As a result, the district court imposed and executed a unified term of fifteen years, with 
seven years fixed.  (Tr., Vol.2, p.25, Ls.16-19; R., pp.103-05.) 
 Mr. Tharp filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction.  
(R., pp.108-09.) 
   
ISSUE 





The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing An Excessive Sentence On 
Mr. Tharp 
 
In order for Mr. Tharp to show an abuse of discretion in the district court’s 
sentencing decision in this case, he must show that, in light of the governing criteria, the 
sentence is excessive considering any view of the facts.  State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 
293, 294 (1997).  The governing criteria, or sentencing objectives, are:  (1) protection of 
society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of 
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing.  Id.  The protection of 
society is the primary objective the court should consider.  State v. Charboneau, 124 
Idaho 497, 500 (1993).  Therefore, a sentence that protects society and also 
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accomplishes the other objectives will be considered reasonable.  Id.; State v. Toohill, 
103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982).  This is because the protection of society is 
influenced by each of the other objectives, and as a result, each must be addressed in 
sentencing.  Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500; I.C. § 19-2521.  However, the Idaho 
Supreme Court has also held that rehabilitation “should usually be the initial 
consideration in the imposition of the criminal sanction.”  State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 
240 (1971), superseded on other grounds as stated in State v. Theil, 158 Idaho 103 
(2015). 
In this case, the sentencing objectives would be best served by the sentence 
defense counsel recommended, as it is the one that would provide not only an 
opportunity, but also the motivation, for Mr. Tharp to engage in timely rehabilitative 
programming.  As defense counsel acknowledged, a period of probation or retained 
jurisdiction would not be appropriate, but a sentence with a shorter fixed time would still 
facilitate timely access to the prison programs, thus giving Mr. Tharp an opportunity to 
prove his desire to change was legitimate.  (Tr., Vol.2, p.17, Ls.6-7; Tr., Vol.2, p.20, 
Ls.4-9.)  On the other hand, defense counsel explained, the sentence the district court 
ultimately imposed risked putting Mr. Tharp in a situation where he “he could just 
perpetuate [the] cycle” which had concerned the district court at sentencing.  (Tr., Vol.2, 
p.20, Ls.8-12; Tr., Vol.2, p.23, L.10 - p.24, L.19.)  That means the sentence ultimately 
imposed provides less protection to society in the long term than the sentence 
recommended by defense counsel. 
To that point, Mr. Tharp is relatively young, and, as the PSI author explained, that 
means the time to try rehabilitative options is now:  “fortunately for him the defendant is 
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young enough to make the necessary changes should his professed intentions be 
genuine.”  (PSI, p.23.)  Therefore, the district court’s decision to foreclose that timely 
opportunity to rehabilitate with an extended fixed sentence constitutes an abuse of its 
discretion.  See, e.g., State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 (1953) (recognizing the timing 
of rehabilitative opportunities is an important consideration); Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 
482, 489 (Ct. App. 2008) (same).  This is particularly true with younger defendants like 
Mr. Tharp.  See State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982); Cook, 145 Idaho at 489-
90. 
Additionally, the Legislature has indicated leniency is appropriate in cases where 
“[t]here were substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the defendant’s criminal 
conduct, though failing to establish a defense.”  I.C. § 19-2521(2)(d).  The district court 
accepted Mr. Tharp’s explanation that he was trying to confront the person who was 
continuing to deal drugs to his girlfriend so as to get him to stop, and that Mr. Tharp had 
not intended to fire his gun during that confrontation.  (Tr., Vol.2, p.22, Ls.12-17.)  It also 
explained that, “even if that person that day had a firearm, of course I think you know 
that you handled this completely wrong.”  (Tr., Vol.2, p.22, Ls.18-19; see also Tr., Vol.2, 
p.15, Ls.18-20 (defense counsel acknowledging that the other facts about the 
confrontation did not excuse Mr. Tharp’s choices during that encounter).)  The district 
court’s statements in this regard show it recognized that there was an imperfect self-
defense claim in this case, and that is precisely the sort of scenario the Legislature 
considered to be grounds for leniency in imposing sentence.  See I.C. § 19-2521(d).  
Therefore, a sufficient consideration all the facts in the record reveals the district court’s 
rejection of the more lenient sentence is an abuse of discretion. 
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There are several other mitigating factors in the record which further support that 
conclusion.  Mr. Tharp repeatedly expressed remorse and accepted responsibility 
for his actions.  (PSI, pp.7-8, 19; Tr., Vol.2, p.21, Ls.1-13.)  He was willing to 
compensate the victims of his actions.  (Tr., Vol.1, p.1, Ls.14-16.)  This is only his 
second adult felony, a fact which is particularly noteworthy given his prior gang 
affiliation.  (PSI, pp.8-10, 21-22.)  The fact that he has dissociated himself from the gang 
(see PSI, pp.13, 22) demonstrates his desire to change is legitimate.  Similarly, the fact 
that he has earned his GED (PSI, p.15) demonstrates he is capable of being successful 
in such efforts.  Finally, he has mental health issues which need to be addressed to help 
him be more likely to succeed upon his eventual release.  (See PSI, pp.101-13.)   
In light of all the mitigating factors, a more lenient sentence which promotes 
rehabilitative options would best serve the goals of sentencing.  As such, the district 
court abused its discretion by imposing a sentence with an excessive fixed term, one 




Mr. Tharp respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems 
appropriate.  Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court 
for a new sentencing hearing. 
 DATED this 16th day of June, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      BRIAN R. DICKSON 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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